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Introduction
The learning process almost invariably produces improvement in
an initial theory as experimental work progresses. The development of the
encapsulation mechanism theory is no exception. Ideas derived from the
heat transfer study in Progress Report No. 5 have permitted changes in
the encapsulation theory described in Progress Report NoO 4 which make
it fit the new information better.
The heat transfer calculations of C-E's No. 5 Progress Report
showed that hot water and not steam would be contained in encapsulated
water of 0.3 to 3.0 ml volumes after the 0.030 second average induction
period for an explosion. A maximum temperature increase of only 60 F
would be realized in this period. The increased internal capsule pressure
must then be due to thermal volumetric expansion of liquid water against
the containment shell of frozen smelt. Pressure development during even
this brief period could be substantial, ranging from 2000 to 6000 psi, as
shown by Figure 3 of the heat transfer study.
Rupture of the shell would be a triggering mechanism for the
explosive generation of steam produced when liquid water from the
fragmented capsule meets molten smelt. The internal pressure developed
in the capsule must serve principally to finely disperse the water and
propel it at high velocity through the body of molten smelt once rupture
occurs. The velocity of the water particles so produced would increase
steam production rate by reducing the thickness of the external steam film
on each water droplet. This film tends to impede heat transfer. The real
explosion then would be due to the explosive generation of steam after
capsule rupture placed its liquid water content in intimate contact with
the molten smelt.
The tensile strength of the encapsulating shell necessary for
an explosion would then have to be sufficient only to contain pressure
high enough to effect proper subdivision and ejection velocity of water
particles from the ruptured capsule.
The importance of encapsulation may be that it initiates a
steam-forming physical explosion like a blasting cap initiates detonation
of a chemical explosion of TNT. In each case, a small burst of energy may
trigger the development of a much larger quantity of PV (pressure volume)
energy from the rapidly expanding gases of the principal explosion.
It may be the case that capsule rupture and the explosive genera-
tion of steam from its small water content could initiate further mixing of
smelt with "bulk" (non-encapsulated) water above on the surface of the
smelt. Mixing of this larger volume of water with smelt would cause an
even larger steam explosion.
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Within the framework of this evolving physical explosion conept,
our laboratory. work during the period of this report was primarily concerned
with two things:
1. Evaluation of the effect of extraneous sodium compounds other
than Na2S and Na2CO3 on the explosiveness of smelt.
2. Evaluation of possible safe quenching agents for the
prevention of smelt explosions.
Four commercial recovery furnace explosions have occurred and
been investigated by the writer (and others) since the initiation of this
project. An attempt to relate pertinent explosion literature and project
explosion consultants' opinions to the post-explosion evidence of the
four explosions and to our laboratory work is appended to this report.
(See Appendix).
Labratory Experiments
a) Effect of sodium sulfate in smelt on explosive violence
The effect of Na2SO4 content of smelt on injection of water or
aqueous solutions has been of considerable interest. Earlier work(1) had
shown that a 2-10% concentration of Na2 SO4 in smelt inhibited explosive
violence in dissolving tank type quenches in which the smelt was poured
into a large volume of water. A series of synthetic smelts of a wide
range of sulfidity was made up from Na2S and NaeCO3 to test the effect
of NaS04 on water injection explosions. Each was melted rapidly in a
graphite.crucible so that reaction of NaeS04 with the carbon crucible
would be minimized. Gaseous CO is evolved vigorously by this reaction
above about 1850 OF so initial smelt temperatures were kept below this
level and the surface of the smelt was observed often to control the
temperature. -Analyses-were-made of several -smelts which contained
Na2SO4 before and after melting by the finally chosen procedure to
assure that the melting technique did not convert appreciable Na2SO4
to Na2S. Once 1800 0F smelt temperature was reached, the usual 3 ml.
successive injections of room temperature water or water solution were
made until either an explosion resulted' or the smelt solidified. Results
are shown in the appended Table 1. .
Runs No. 1-5 indicated, as recognized from many previous tosts,
that Na2S level must generally be above about 23% (approx. 30% TAPPI
sulfidity) for water injections to cause explosions. (This limit was
approximately 20% for dissolving tank explosions. However, the minimum
Na2S for explosions with both kinds of smelt-water mixing is lowered
significantly by presence of small percents of explosion intensifiers
like NaC1 or NaOH in the smelt as discussed further in section (c) or
dissolved salts in the quench water.) Presence of 5.7 and 10% Na1SO4
did not alter this non-violent behavior as shown in Runs Nos. 2 and 3.
Runs Nos. 4 and 5, however, showed that smelt below the threshold Na2S
content (approximately 20% Na2S, 25% TAPPI sulfidity) containing 5%
Na2SO4 exploded very violently when either 10% green liquor (10% smelt
dissolved in water) or 10% sodium chloride was injected into the smelt.
The fact that both NaC1 and green liquor produced the same increase of
explosive violence indicates that the Na2S does not have a unique role
in intensifying explosions. A better explanation for what appears to
be a general property of dissolved salts seems to be the one in C-E
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Progress Report No. 5, i.e., that stable salts dissolved in water decrease
the life of the vapor blanket separating liquid water from hot smelt in a
capsule. This increases heat transfer rate and hence, explosiveness.
Explosions resulted from Runs Nos. 6 and 7. These four tests indicate
that up to 10% Na2SO4 would be inadequate to inhibit explosive violence
even in low sulfide smelt if it contacted green liquor formed by the
dissolving of smelt by uncontrolled water in the furnace.
Runs Nos. 8 and 9 were made using a different kind of smelt
composition. This was low sulfide smelt sensitized with 5% NaC1 as might
occur with smelt in a mill pulping salt-water borne logs. (Concentrations
of up to 12% NaC1 were found in the smelt from one such mill.) It
exploded on addition of water by both injection and continuous stream
addition. The latter term has been referred to as "simulated tube
leak" in previous reports. Run No. 10 with this type of smelt containing
10% Na2 SO4 as inhibitor also exploded, but mildly.
The next series of Runs, Nos. 11 to 16 was made to test Na2SO4
over a range of concentrations in moderate to high sulfide smelt (25%-
37% TAPPI sulfidity) which is more explosive. All exploded, some very
violently, on successive water injections even though NaeS04 in 5.7 to
17.5% was present. Runs NOs. 12 to 16 smelts all lie in a range of Na2S
proportions in Na2CO3 which exploded violently without Na2 S04 in earlier
experiments. Comparing Runs Nos. 1 and 11 indicates that a proportion of
Na2SO4 high enough may even intensify explosive violence, rather than
acting as smelt modifier to reduce explosive intensity.
Data in this Table prove within the limits of experimental
procedure used, that sodium sulfate does not act as an explosion inhibitor
on injection of either water or 10% water solutions of smelt or NaC2.
b) Effect of sodium hydroxide and sodium oxide in the smelt
A previous progress report by the Babcock and Wilcox research
group suggests the possibility of an explosion caused by an exothermic
reaction of water with Na2 0, if Na2O is present in smelt. Because this
suggestion implies a non- combustible explosion, a type of explosion
of interest in the C-E program, experiments were conducted to indicate
the extent to which Na2O might be present in smelt, and the significance
to explosions of the reaction between water and Na2O.
The first series of experiments was arranged to test the effect
of graphite crucibles on the formation of NaOH or Na2O. A 450 gram batch
of normal 28% Na2S smelt was maintained molten at 1600°F and sampled after
15, 30 and 45 minute periods. (Fifteen minutes is the normal holding time
on batches for C-E explosion experiments.) No NaOH, Na2O or elemental
sodium, which are grouped together by the TAPPI analysis method, was found
by duplicate analyses on each of the three samples.
Another batch of 28% Na2S smelt, prepared by the regular
procedure, was heated in like manner to 1800°F in a graphite crucible.
Here again no NaOH or Na20 was found by analysis after heating for 15, 30
and 45 minutes. When maintained at 1800°F smelt temperature or below,
graphite crucibles have not been found to modify the composition of
smelt. Smelt melted in crucibles made of ZrO2 , iron, and graphite gave
identical results in explosion tests with water injection. Graphite has
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the advantage of being by far the most resistant material to corrosive
attack of smelt found by C-E experimenters. Graphite is also cheap and
readily available. It has excellent induction heating characteristics.
Carbon is a material "native" to the chemical recovery furnace since it
composes approximately 50% of char in the ash bed. These desirable
attributes and the above experimental results confirm the choice of
graphite as a crucible material for smelt explosion test studies.
Suppose Na2O was produced in smelt by chemical reaction in a
furnace bed. What effect would Na20 have on the explosion behavior of
the smelt when it contacted water? These and other questions were to
be answered in the next series of experiments. A detailed analysis (1)
of carefully taken and preserved samples of smelt from the spouts of
15 kraft mills operating under a wide variety of conditions was made by
the writer about ten years ago. The maximum concentration of NaOH plus
Na20 and Na (if present) in any sample was 3.2% on one but the range of
all other samples was 0.1 - 1.3%. If higher concentrations of these
ingredients had been present in smelt in the furnaces, they must have
been volatilized or changed by chemical reaction before reaching the
smelt spout.
First, a small pea-sized quantity of pure Na2O powder (95.7%
by analysis) was dropped into about 100 ml. of room temperature water to
gain some idea of the explosive violence of pure material on quenching.
It combined with water by the following chemical reaction:
Na20 + H20 2NaOH + 44.7 Kcal (per mol of Na2O)
(gas)
or NA2O + H20 -- 2NaOH + 36.2 Kcal
(liquid)
Samples of this size and three times-as large produced a few bubbles and
some warmth, but no real violence. Encouraged by these results we decided
to proceed with explosion tests of Na2O dissolved in a variety of melts.
Repeated successive 3 ml. injections of room temperature water were made
in each 450g batch of molten material at approximately 18OO°F until it
either solidified or an explosion resulted. Melting was done in graphite
crucibles in the induction heating furnace by the usual technique. Results
are shown in Table II.
Runs Nos. 1 to 3 were made with varying proportions of NaOH in
Na2C0 3 . No concentration of NaOH in Na2CO3 produced explosions on
injections of water into melts of these compositions. Even 100% NaOH
did not explode. Runs Nos. 5 and 6 by contrast showed that 15% and 20%
sodium chloride in Na2 CO3 caused violent explosions. These data again
emphasized that presence of sulfides is not required for an explosion.
Run No. 7 with 10% Na20 in Na2 CO3 , wnicn is about five times tne
normal level in plant smelt, did not explode on repeated water injections
into the molten material. (The Na20 in this and other experiments was
quickly added to already molten 1600°F melt in order to avoid prior
reaction with moisture from non-molten ingredients.) The 15% Na2O in
Na2CO3 of Run No. 8 exploded very violently. At this point it seemed
that enough calibration runs had been made to indicate roughly the lower
explosive limit for Na20 in Na2C0 3 .
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Runs Nos. 9 to 15 were made to compare the effect of Na2O and
NaOH in kraft.smelt with that of NaCl. Run No. 9 showed again that
20% Na2S smelt did not explode with repeated successive water injections.
Neither were there explosions in Runs Nos. 10, 11, and 12 when 2% Na2O.
NaOH, and NaC1 were added. The same kraft smelt containing 5% Na2O
exploded violently in Run No. 13, but 5% NaOH in Run No. 14 and 5%
NaC1 in Run No. 15 also sensitized the smelt and produced the same order
of explosive violence.
It is concluded that neither Na20 nor NaOH in concentrations
normally found in smelt (up to about 2%) was sufficient to make 20% Na2S
smelt explode violently. Sodium chloride at 2% gave the same results.
Sodium oxide at 5% in 20% Na2S smelt sensitized it enough to produce
violent explosions. Both 5% sodium hydroxide and 5% sodium chloride,
however, produced the same violence as 5% sodium oxide in the same
smelt.
From these experiments it appears that no unusual hazard would
be presented by sodium oxide in kraft smelt at normal concentrations. At
up to about four times the normal concentration, the effect of Na2O was
indistinguishable from that of the same proportion of NaC1 or NaOH. Due
to these results and the discovery that no detectable Na2O, Na, or NaOH
was created by the normal melting procedure for smelts in graphite
crucibles, we feel that Na2O, Na, and NaOH played no part in the violent
smelt-water explosions under nitrogen atmosphere in the spherical test
vessel which were described in the last C-E progress report.
c) Effect of sodium chloride combined with high sodium sulfide in
smelt on explosion inhibition by quench solutions
Considerable attention has been devoted to aqueous quenching
-solutions-because they--still appear to offer the possibility for
developing a safe commercially-feasible method for shutting down a
recovery boiler rapidly should a water leak develop in the furnace.
Results and discussion of experiments on quenching agents have been
presented in the last four C-E progress reports.
Injection of quenching solutions into smelt has been used in
most experiments because this method of mixing provides the most violent
and consistent explosions with water. Thus injection represents the most
drastic laboratory condition known for mixing smelt and water. If a
quenching solution prevents explosions when injected into smelt under a
wide variety of conditions, it is considered a good candidate for further
study. But only after passing all tests without any kind of explosion
would it be recommended for furnace testing.
Although 10% aqueous ammonium sulfate solution succeeded in
inhibiting smelt explosions under a wide variety of simulated plant
conditions described in the last progress report, it had not until
recently been tried on high sulfidity smelt which contains sodium
chloride, a smelt composition known from previous work to increase
greatly the violence of smelt-water explosions.
A series of smelt compositions containing high Na2S content,
above about 23%, was made up to contain NaC1. A succession of 3 ml.
injections of water or aqueous solution was made into each molten 1800F
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smelt until an explosion or solidification of smelt resulted. The
outcome of these experiments is reported in Table III. Run No. 1 showed
that high sulfidity smelt with 5% NaC1 explodes violently on water
injection. (It does also without NaCl). Run No. 2 confirmed previous
data of C-E Progress Report No. 5 in illustrating that explosions with
low sulfide smelt containing 5% NaC1 are inhibited successfully by 10%
ammonium sulfate solution.
Runs Nos. 3, 4 and 5, however, showed that the combination of
high sulfide with even 1% NaC1 was not inhibited by 10% ammonium sulfate,
the most promising candidate developed to that time. Runs Nos. 6 and 7
(the latter run in duplicate) on the new standard smelt with high sulfide
and 5% NaC1 showed that 10% ammonium bicarbonate did act as an inhibitor
where 10% ammonium sulfate had failed. It was reasoned that this
contrasting behavior might be due to the difference in rate at which
the two compounds form a vapor blanket on contact with hot smelt.
(Chloride-containing smelt may be able to develop more rapidly an
encapsulation shell strong enough to allow build-up of water-dispersing
pressure since it is believed to be a stronger per unit thickness than
smelt which contains no chlorides.) Runs Nos. 8 and 9 were hence made
with ammonium hydroxide which has a high vapor pressure at relatively
low temperature. The 9% (by weight as NH3) ammonium hydroxide solution
did successfully inhibit explosions but, like ammonium bicarbonate, it
might pose in-plant problems due to lack of stability on storage. Runs
Nos. 10 and 11 showed that almost the same concentration of ammonium hydroxide
would be necessary when combined with 10% ammonium sulfate solution.
Next it was decided to try the effect of increased concentrations
of ammonium sulfate in water solution. The 15% concentration at room
temperature in duplicate runs No. 12 inhibited explosions with chloride-
containing smelt. When chilled to 40°F in Run No. 13, however, it gave a
mild explosion probably due to the decreased rate of ammonia vapor
production. Chilling was used to approximate conditions of use in a
plant with outdoor storage of quench solution. Further increase in
concentration to 20% at room temperature in Run No. 14 inhibited
explosions in duplicate experiments. At this point it was reasoned
that the safest ammonium sulfate solution to use in a furnace would be
the one capable of safe quenching after greatest dilution with boiler
water from a tube leak. A forty per cent solution, which is the limit
of solubility of this salt at 32 F, was chosen for further tests. Run
No. 15 at room temperature and No. 16 at 212°F, showed that 40% (NH4 )2S04
successfully inhibited explosions over this temperature range.
Run No. 17 showed that 40% solution worked even with 10% NaC1
dissolved in the smelt. Runs Nos. 18 and 19 showed that 40% solution also
was effective at 140 F and 32°F. Runs Nos. 20 and 21 showed that 40%
solution successfully inhibited the most violent quenching smelt to date
(with 10 and 15% NaC1, and high sulfide) even when the solution was chilled
to 36-38F before injection.
It would seem in tests to date that 40% ammonium sulfate could
inhibit any plant smelt composition with whicn we are familiar. More tests
under a wide variety of simulated furnace conditions, However, must be run
before a definite recommendation can be made.
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d) Effect of anion type in quench solutions
It was a natural point of curiosity to wonder if some other
ammonium compound or gas-producing chemical would inhibit explosions
better than ammonium sulfate. A series of previously untried compounds
was made up in water solution and injected in 3 ml increments into very
high sulfide smelt with no chloride by the standard test procedure used
in other experiments. Results are shown in Table IV.
The 10% ammonium sulfate solution successfully inhibited
explosions, while 5% produced a surge showing border-line effectiveness.
The 5% NH4C1 of Run No. 4, by contrast with 5% (NH4 )2S0 4 , gave a
violent explosion. The 10% NH4C1 of Run No. 5 gave a mild explosion
as did also Run No. 6 with 10% NH4Br, another halide. All halides tried
to date in either the smelt or in quenching solutions have increased
explosion violence. Ammonium acetate in Run No. 7 was an effective
inhibitor. It has poor stability on exposure to air and offers no
known advantage over (NH4) 2 SO4 . In Run No. 8 the 10% ammonium bisulfate
solution, which had a strongly acid reaction in water, was also effective.
This suggested that dilute sulfuric acid might also work since it would
generate gases (CO2 and H2S) on contact with smelt. Such was the case
if the acid were strong enough as demonstrated in Runs Nos. 10 and 11.
At present no advantage of acid solutions is recognized. Storage
and transfer to the furnace might cause corrosion problems. Pure ammonium
sulfate in 10% solution is slightly acid with a pH of 6.0. In another
experiment not shown in this table, the addition of enough sulfuric acid
to adjust the pH of 10% (NH4 )2 S04 to 3.3 (as might occur with impure
commercial grade material) did not decrease its effectiveness. Buffering
ammonium sulfate solution with enough ammonia to put it on the alkaline
side, about pH 9, would protect the tanks and lines from corrosion. This
small proportion of free NH40H would be expected to slightly increase
explosion inhibition.
Run No. 12 with 5% ammonium sulfamate, NH4 SO3NH2, a fire
retardant material with high thermal decomposition point, 320 F, did
not work and neither did urea in Run No. 14 which decomposes above 270 F.
The 10% sodium sulfate solution of Run No. 13 caused an explosion. This
agrees with the analysis of a furnace explosion reviewed by the writer in
which salt cake in water solution (rather than in black liquor) had been
sprayed into the furnace bed. The 10 .ammonium bicarbonate inhibited
explosions in duplicate Runs Nos.15 and l6. It has a high gas-producing
capacity but is thermally unstable in dry form and specially in aqueous
solution. The dibasic ammonium citrate was a successful inhibitor at
either l0% or 5% in Runs Nos. 17 and 18 but has the disadvantage (compared
with ammonium sulfate) of less stability and more cost.
To date there appear to be three serious candidates for further
study: ammonium sulfate, ammonium hydroxide, and ammonium bicarbonate.
We are concerned that the latter two solutions applied to the ash bed and
smelt in a furnace may have too much volatility of active ingredient, i.e.,
that they may lose gas supply too rapidly on contact with hot furnace gases
or alkaline char to retain enough for safe quenching of molten smelt below,
which is the real problem. Only further testing can establish whether this
is a valid criticism.
C-7
Discussion of Quenching Agents
How much quenching solution would be necessary to cool the molten
smelt to a safe temperature in a 20' x 16' 300 ton C-E decanting bottom
furnace? Mr. L. J. Jacobs of C-E made a number of assumptions in performing
the following calculation. For instance, the sensible heat content of the
ash bed was disregarded. A 3.82" depth of molten smelt was assumed over
the entire bottom of the furnace. Furnace hearth dimensions of 19' 5/8"
x 15' 9 5/8" were taken to correspond with an actual contract. The smelt
would be cooled only to the solidification point, 1430°F. Thin would
require approximately 263 gallons of aqueous quench solution or 2200 lb,
assuming heat removal was not affected by the dissolved (NH4)2SO4. The
water of the solution would generate about 60,000 ft3 of steam at 212-F
which would be expected to provide an inert atmosphere for combustion
reactions, especially in the bottom of the furnace. Chemical reactions
in the bed like pyrolysis of black liquor and the water gas reaction
would probably be quenched speedily by spraying liquid water solution
on the bed, since aqueous solutions have a high heat capacity.
What makes some aqueous chemical solutions non-explosive on
injection into molten smelt? The answer seems to lie in their ability to
create large volumes of gas quickly on contacting smelt. The gas
production necessary for a successful aqueous quenching agent can cone
from several types of reactions: (a) the production of vapor by
volatilization of a high vapor pressure material like ammonium hydroxide,
volatile compounds like acetone and methyl alcohol, or even hot water above
187°F. (b) the chemical reaction of smelt with aqueous solutions like
dilute sulfuric acid (to give C02 and H2S) or ammonium sulfate (to give
ammonia) or (c) the thermal decomposition of compounds like ammonium
bicarbonate (which yields H20, C02, and NH3).
The gas blanket-provided inside the capsule by such quenching
agents is believed to decrease the rate of heat transfer from the molten
smelt to water inside the capsule and hence also the thickness of the
surrounding frozen smelt and the temperature of the encapsulated water.
In addition we believe this gas blanket provides a compressible volume
inside the shell which is able to absorb thermal expansion of the
encapsulated liquid water without great increase in internal capsule
pressure. The presence of this enveloping gas film around the enclosed
volume of water would thus decrease the chance of an explosive encapsulation.
A vapor blanket would decrease the build-up of water atomizing pressure if a
water-containing capsule did form and rupture.
Quenching agent candidates can now be chosen easier since several
tentative criteria have been established which simplify selection. For
instance, a quenching agent ideally should: (1) generate large volumes of
non-flammable, non-toxic gas readily on rapid heating in aqueous solution
below 212°F or on chemical reaction with smelt, (2) have sufficient
stability in aqueous solution to allow long-term storage in metal tanks
over a range of temperatures normal to in-plant and outdoor conditions,
(3) leave no residue on application to smelt which will contaminate the
the chemical recovery system, (4) be highly soluble in water, and (5)
be cheap, non-toxic, stable on storage in solid form, non-corrosive, and
readily available in commercial quantities. Some of these qualifications




Work in the final four months of the project in 1965 will
concentrate primarily on the development of practical remedies for
smelt explosions in furnaces. The mechanism studies have provided several
clues to measures which could possibly prevent explosions in the field.
Areas to be covered include the following:
1) The application of aqueous quench solutions to the smelt and ash bed
as soon as a tube leak is discovered. (A good automatic system
for leak detection would add considerable utility to this system.)
The three candidates mentioned earlier, ammonium sulfate, ammonium
bicarbonate, and ammonium hydroxide will be screened extensively
by tests which simulate a wide variety of furnace conditions.
Some of the variables to be studied are the effect of smelt
composition (Na2S, NaOH, and NaC1), presence of ash bed and
black liquor, tests on samples of plant smelt from several mills,
method of addition of quench solution, and a detailed analysis of
decomposition products, both gases and solids. Additional
quenching agents will be screened concurrently as they come to
our attention.
2) The tendency of black liquor itself to explode physically in contact
with smelt will be explored more thoroughly above the 55% maximum
solids concentration which exploded in previous tests. New means
of injecting heavy liquors will be tried in order to determine
more exactly the upper concentration (and inorganic salt content)
which can explode under the best possible mixing conditions. The
effect of strong black liquor applied to the surface of smelt on
cooling rate and accessibility to water will also be studied.
3) A limited- additional-number of smelt additives to modify its explosiveness
on contact with water will be tried. Fifteen are on hand ready
for testing.
4) A scale up of water quantities from 5 ml. maximum at present in the
plywood booth to 50 or 100 ml should be made in the spherical
vessel in order to get a better idea of the pressure signature
of larger explosions more characteristic of those in an operating
furnace. Such data would be useful in the stress analysis study
of furnace explosions being made by Mr. R. Robinson at Illinois
Institute of Technology Research Institute.
Completion of these additional studies should allow us to make
definite recommendations about remedial measures worthy of study in a black
liquor-fired semi or full scale furnace. This may be the next step beyond
the present research contract.
Conclusions
(1) Under proper circumstances molten smelt can react physically with
submerged liquid water very rapidly to produce steam explosively.
(2) Sodium sulfate in the smelt does not inhibit physical smelt-water
explosions.
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(3) The normal procedure for preparing experimental smelt in graphite
crucibles does not produce significant quantities of Na2O,
NaOH, or elemental sodium.
(4) The presence of Na2O, NaOH, or NaC1 in laboratory smelts results in
equivalent behavior on contact with water indicating that no
unusual explosive contribution is to be expected from the
presence of Na2O.
(5) High sulfide smelt (above about 25% Na2S) with sodium chloride is
a particularly explosive composition hard to inhibit by
quenching solutions. The 40% ammonium sulfate solution in
water, either hot or cold, successfully quenched high sulfide-
chloride smelts. More work on this and other quenching
solutions will be necessary before a recommendation for plant
trial can be made.
Expenditures on the C-E Smelt-Water Explosion Study
Costs (cumulative) of the Combustion Engineering, Inc. study as















































5 10% Green Liquor
5 10% NaC1





























* Crucible shattered by explosion
V is volent
VV is very violent
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TABLE II
Effect of NaOH, NaC1, and NapO in Melts
(3 ml. injections of water were used in each case)
Melt, % Compostion
1. 15 NaOH - 85 Na2C03
2. 20 NaOH - 80 Na2CO3
3. 50 NaOH - 50 Na2CO3
4. 100 NaOH
5. 15 NaC1 - 85 Na2C03
6. 20 NaCl - 80 Na2 C03
7. 10 Na20 - 90 Na2CO3
8. 15 Na20 - 85 Na2CO3
9. 20% NaS smelt
10. 2 Na20 - 20% Na2S smelt
11. 2 NaOH - 20% Na2S smelt
12. 2 NaC1 - 20% Na2S smelt
13. 5 Na20 - 20% Na2 S smelt
14. 5 NaOH - 20% Na 2 S smelt
15. 5 NaC1 - 20% Na2S smelt
* Cruic
V is violent
















































































10% (NH4)2S04, 3% NH4OH
10% (NH4) 2S0 4 , 9% NH40H
15% (NH4) 2 SO4
40°F 15% (NH4) 2 S0 4
20% (NH4) 2 So4
40% (NH4) 2 S04























** Made with room temp.(80°F)





































































5% NH4 Sulfamate (NH4S0 3NH2 )
10% Na2S04
10% Urea (NH2 )2CO
10% NH4HC03
10% Dibasic NH4 citrate
5% Dibasic NH4 citrate
* Shattered Crucible
V is violent






















Preliminary Analysis of Recovery Furnace Explosion Damage
(a) Shock waves developed by smelt-water explosions
A chemical reaction to be explosive must have three characteristics(2).
The heat of reaction is a criterion of the efficiency of the explosive material
and is its most important characteristic. Thus a chemical reaction must be
highly exothermic to be explosive in nature. Second, it must take place at a
high rate, which distinguishes normal chemical reactions from explosive ones.
Finally, a chemical reaction must form a gas. For instance, the following well-
known thermite reaction is rapid and highly exothermic, but does not form a gas.
It hence does not explode.
2A1 + Fe2O3 ----..Al12 3 + 2Fe + 198Kcal (99Kcal/mol of Al)
It can therefore be concluded that only the simultaneous combination of
these three basic factors: exothermicity, high process rate, and gas formation, can
guarantee a chemical type explosion.
Higgins and Schultz (3 ), in their thorough 3tudy of molten metal-water inter-
actions which might take place in case of a run-away nuclear reactor, described a
number of interesting results which seem to contrast with those from the present
study. They mixed intimately the molten metals, uranium, zirconium, aluminum, so-
dium-potassium alloy, and stainless steel with water under various conditions and
recorded the pressure waves and other variables in a highly instrumented system.
Mixing was accomplished by spraying the molten metals into water and also by finely
dispersing molten metal submerged in water with a blasting cap. With the two method
of mixing, the results were equivalent when particlesize distribution was approxi-
mately the same.
Higgins and Schultz state that the chemical reaction of molten aluminum
with water (which occurs if the metal is very hot and finely divided) is highly exo-
thermic and produces hydrogen, and that the reaction is nil up to 2138°F. (The
melting point of aluminum is 1220°F.)
2A1 + 3H20--->Al203 + 3H2 + 160Kcal(80Kcal/mol of Al)
The proportion of aluminum reacting with water (approx. 60%) was higher
than for other metals tested.
Higgins and Schultz recorded the pressure rise times on oscillograms (re-
produced as Figure 1). To quote them:
"The pressure pulses measured in the explosion dynamometer
were primarily due to the liberation and expansion of the
hot hydrogen gas.......
"In observing the pressure rise time, it is evident that the
Appendix C-l
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metal-water reactions are not high-order explosions --
taking milliseconds rather than microseconds to attain peak
pressure. The metal-water reactions could be described as
deflagrations instead of detonations, but are slightly more
brisant than black powder, as indicated by the rates of
pressure rise..... From the above considerations and from
the absence of shattering-type damage, it was concluded that
the effect of shock waves was not important in these tests."
Contrast these rates of chemical reaction of molten metals and water with
the pressure signature (pressure versus time trace) of a typical C.E. laboratory
smelt-water physical explosion reproduced as Figure 2. It can readily be seen that
physical smelt-water explosions: (1) average 0.1 to 3 milliseconds and are hence
5 to 300 times faster, (2) have much faster rise and decay times, and (3) are of
an entirely different type from deflagrating chemical reactions of molten metals
with water. The wave from a smelt-water explosion by contrast is a shock wave
produced from explosively-generated steam. This concept is discussed in more de-
tail in the section which follows.
The violent smelt-water explosions in nitrogen atmosphere described in C.E.
Progress Report No. 5 ruled out combustion as an explanation for these laboratory
explosions.
(b) Inspection of four explosions
The distribution of damage in all four chemical recovery furnace explo-
-sions inspected by the writer during the course--of this--study-has-been- of--the -same
general pattern but the explosion intensity has varied widely. Two of them pro-
duced little easily-evident damage in the furnace up to an elevation one floor
above the operating level (approx. 25' above the molten smelt level). Here and
above the buckstays became bulged on all four sides. Corner bolts above this level
were broken in the case of powerful explosions. In three out of four cases, the
corners of the furnace above the operating floor generally split open vertically
as designed to meet severe pressure surges. The economizer casing usually was
opened. In two of the four explosions substantial (1"-4") deflections were noted
in heavy I beams under localized areas of the furnace bottom. Beams were not
measured after the first two explosions.
An unusually severe series of multiple explosions occurred over a four
minute period in one furnace. The smelt was cleaned thoroughly from the surface
of floor tubes in the entire bottom. Two highly localized dish-shaped depres-
sions about a yard in diameter were found in the floor tubes. One, 4 1/2" deep,
was near the left rear corner. The other, also 4 1/2" deep, was near the middle
of the furnace front close to the center smelt spout. The corner depression
matched an approx. 5" localized outward displacement of adjacent vertical water
wall tubes extending upward about 4'. The left rear vertical corner (only) of




level. The 14" wide flange I beams beneath the furnace floor had been de-
flected 2 1/2 to 4". The furnace roof was opened and minor casing damage to
the economizer was incurred. On hydrostatic testing the furnace, a number of
leaks were found where wall tubes had been torn loose from welds to channels
directly above the corner floor depression. Correspondingly, the depression
near the center of the furnace floor matched the location where the ripped
smelt spout "can" is believed to have placed water in the molten smelt.
Two consultant explosion specialists examined the damage in this
furnace and agreed that the energy density required to create the depressions
was far above that which would have been produced by a combustible gas mixture.(4)
(c) Theory on distribution of furnace damage
It is believed that the damage in three furnace explosions and major
damage in the fourth was due to a physical smelt-water explosion mechanism.
These explosions liberated high density PV energy (in the shock wave range) in
a limited area of the furnace bottom where water contacted molten smelt. The
decaying explosion pressure wave then spread through the remainder of the fur-
nace structure. The general pattern of damage on furnace structures which at
first glance might suggest gas explosions high in the furnace, may instead be
the result of the distribution of furnace containment strength and the effects
of either a shock wave alone or a shock wave combined with a rapid pressure rise
similar in characteristics to a combustible explosion.
In a significant number of chemical recovery furnace explosions, we be-
lieve that the distribution of damage observed could not have been caused by a
rapid increase in pressure of the total furnace atmosphere in such a large en-
closure. In these cases, the distribution of damage can best be accounted for
on the basis that it was caused by a shock wave with or without a deflagration
wave.
From a study of the available literature, the large scale liberation of
flammable gas by chemical reaction of molten smelt and water (if such occurred
in a furnace) and its subsequent ignition could not have caused such a shock wave.
This follows from the fact that ignition of a limited amount of flammable gas in
a furnace would not result in a detonation but rather in a deflagration type of
explosion which would not produce a shock wave. A deflagration wave, which can
produce a maximum of about 150 psi pressure increase, travels at subsonic speed.
Hot gaseous products from the explosive combustion of a flammable gas mixture
expand and create a pressure increase through the whole volume of the container.
This would hence distribute pressure rather evenly to nearby walls of the furnace.
The postulation that damage was created by a shock wave from the explo-
sive production of steam in chemical recovery furnaces is supported by several
observations. These include the following:
Appendix C-3
APPENDIX
1) Localized depressions in the floor tubes which could not have been
created by combustible gas explosions.
2) Since no visible flames were observed to issue from furnace open-
ings in the four recent explosions, a combustible gas explosion
is not indicated. Some explosions occurred while there was an ac-
tively burning bed in the furnace.
3) The significant deflections of heavy I beams beneath the furnace
could not be caused by explosion of combustible gas mixtures. The
development of pressure from a deflagration explosion would cause
opening of the furnace corners which would relieve the pressure
before significant floor beam deflection could occur.
4) From the accounts read, the nature of and damage from plant explo-
sions caused by introducing molten steel, aluminum, and cobalt, as
well as molten non-metals like bauxite (A1203) and sodium chloride
into water is strikingly similar to that from smelt-water explosions.
None of these former explosions could be attributed to the formation
and subsequent oxidation of a flammable gas.
Shock waves,like sound, have directional effects. They can be re-
flected from surfaces and when wave fronts coincide after reflection, a more power-
ful force may be applied to a localized area. Shock waves of numerically small
pressure magnitude per square inch can create significant damage, as illustrated
by data of the following table (5).
Over-pressure* in
Shock Wave, PSI Damage
0.5 to 1.0 Shatters glass windows.
1.0 to 2.0 Shatters corrugated asbestos siding. Corrugated
steel or aluminum paneling fails and buckles.
2.0 to 3.0 Concrete wall panels, 8 or 12 inches thick (not
reinforced) shatter.
2.5 Moderate damage to light steel frame industrial
buildings.
4.0 Moderate damage to medium steel frame industrial
buildings and to wall bearing, brick buildings.
5.5 Moderate damage to steel frame office type build-
ings and to reinforced concrete frame and wall
multi-story buildings. Severe damage to wall-
bearing brick buildings.
* Pressure above atmospheric
Appendix C-4
APPENDIX
How can a physical smelt-water explosion in the bottom of a furnace
result in damage far above to the casing, corners, refractory, and even in
the economizer? Another part of the answer may lie in the distribution of
structural strengths in various part of the furnace itself. The bottom
and lower welded furnace walls are much stronger than the upper walls and
economizer casing. The furnace roof in many designs is also strong. It
may be a correct analogy to compare resistance to explosion force between
a shot gun with muzzle plugged by mud and a furnace with a smelt explosion
in the bottom. In the former case, the muzzle often "banana peels" i.e.,
splits in several longitudinal sections when fired, while the breech where
the shell was exploded remains intact because of its greater tensile strength
produced by thicker metal. These opinions should not be assumed to take issue
with current furnace design, since it would be technically infeasible to de-
sign an explosion damage-proof furnace.
The fact that all explosions to date have been described as "muffled"
or "rumbling" probably reflects the sound-deadening effect of the heavier -
armored bottom location in which they are believed to occur. (Lab explosions
give a short "crack" which implies high velocity. Transducer pressure traces
of the shock waves reinforce this view.) The proposed hearth area location
of these explosions may provide an explanation also for the extremely low
injury rate of personnel who usually work at the smelt spout or operating floor
elevations of the recovery furnace.
No chemical recovery furnace explosion to date has been observed by
those nearby to expel flames from the furnace openings, although this question
is always asked. The operators usually refer only to blinding clouds of steam
and finely divided black ash driven from the smelt spouts, liquor gun openings,
and fissures in the casing created by the explosion.
For the reasons outlined in this section, it is believed that all four
explosion sites recently inspected by the writer involved contact of water or
some aqueous solution (other than strong black liquor) with molten smelt. Such
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RESULTS OF AEROJET EXPLOSION DYNAMOMETER TESTS
10 gm Al AT 37580 F
10 gm Zr AT 3722 ° F
10 gm 303 STAINLESS STEEL AT 4118 ° F
10 gm NaK AT 122°F
10gm AL AT 2138°F
20 gm FFFG BLACK POWDER
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